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Rethinking Temporary Foreign Workers’ Rights: Living Conditions of 
Technical Interns in the Japanese Technical Internship Program (TIP) 
                             Chieko Kamibayashi 
1. Foreign Workers’ Rights and Labor Problems                        
This paper examines how the restrictions on temporary foreign workers’ rights affect 
the working lives of technical interns in the Japanese Technical Internship Program 
(TIP), and how the program transforms the rural workforce into an industrial workforce. 
It is true that foreign workers have fewer rights that are more limited in scope than those 
of Japanese citizens and denizens or permanent foreign resident. On the other hand, the 
modern societies in which we live have a history of protecting the idea that every man 
should enjoy the same fundamental rights. All democratic states are proponents of the 
principle of “equal treatment of indigenous and foreign workers.” Western countries, 
which have a long history of taking in immigrants, have revisited this idea of equal 
treatment on numerous occasions in the past. However, the very fact the same principle 
continues to be reiterated proves the difficulty of its realization in the modern world. 
In the Japanese sociological sphere to which I belong, scholars have recently begun to 
turn their attention to ethnic studies. Recognizing the social importance of the problems 
faced by foreign workers, we are ethically driven to study these problems. Even in 
Japan, whose population has remained relatively homogeneous, the issue of foreign 
workers’ rights has come to the fore of sociological research.  And in the international 
immigration studies sphere, Surak rightly takes Japanese immigration policy, 
especially foreigner rights’ policy, as a typical immigration policy of non-Western 
liberal-democratic and capitalistic country which receives foreign workers from the 
convergence theory(Surak, 2008).  The article points out that present Japanese 
immigration policy has to combat with the problem of foreign workers’ rights.   
The term “labor problem” may seem to be an anachronism in modern Japan, where 
workers’ rights are established, decent wage levels are guaranteed, and rules for 
labor-management relations are prescribed. As such, one might ask whether the term 
“labor problem,” which may have been used in the past, isn’t hyperbole in modern times. 
But, we must recognize that foreign workers, especially temporary foreign workers, are 
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subject to legally-prescribed limits in both the public and private spheres. Restriction of 
their rights relative to Japanese citizens tends to cause labor problems at a primitive 
level. Cases of mistreatment of temporary foreign workers, including the non-provision 
of overtime pay, the breaking of labor contracts, and violation of the minimum wage 
regulation, are quite common, particularly among employers of technical interns. To our 
regret, then, we must wipe the dust off the term “labor problem” and apply it to what 
has unfortunately become status quo practice. 
In addition to providing solutions to labor disputes between employers and foreign 
workers, a significant goal of studying foreign workers’ labor problems is the creation 
and enhancement of industrial workforce in developing countries.  Kiyokawa argues 
that, in developing countries, labor management is a key factor in the formation of a 
modern industrial labor force (Kiyokawa, 2003). Arguably, the role played by labor 
management in the creation of a disciplined, highly-motivated industrial workforce 
from rural low-skilled workers is greater in developing countries than in developed 
countries. Especially in the early stages of industrialization, a disciplined workforce is 
indispensable for development of the society. This may also be the case for foreign 
workers from rural areas in their country of origin who now work in factories in other 
countries. Through improvements in their working and living conditions, such farmers 
are able to transform themselves into productive industrial workers.  
The reason for focusing on foreign workers’ rights in this paper is the fact that the 
various labor problems faced by foreign workers are the result of their limited rights. In 
Japan, the term “foreign workers” typically means ethnic Japanese-Brazilians or 
Brazilians of Japanese descent, technical interns, and illegal (undocumented) workers. 
Technical interns face greater restrictions under the present immigration law than 
foreign workers in any other category; as such, monitoring and examination of their 
rights and living conditions is especially warranted. The problems faced by technical 
interns are not of an individual nature, i.e. related to the character of individual interns, 
but have to do with the structure of the TIP system as a whole and with the process by 
which rural foreign workers are transformed into a modern industrial workforce.  
Therefore, in the following section I discuss the various rights extended to foreign 
technical interns and examine how their disciplinary training and everyday arrangement 
may lead to various labor problems. 
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2. Foreign Technical Interns’ Rights and Restrictions 
(1) Restrictions on length of stay 
The TIP was established in 1993, in Japan, a country which has never had a formal 
immigration policy (Bartram, 2000). Since then, the program has served as a channel 
for introducing low-skilled workers into the country’s labor force. But as the number of 
interns has increased to almost 130 thousand in 2010, various labor problems have 
occurred. A new visa category, “Technical Intern Training,” was established under the 
Reformed Immigration Control Act in 2010, with the goal of protecting the rights of 
technical interns. Prior to this revision, technical interns were categorized together with 
individuals on working-holiday visas under the category of “designated activities.” With 
the introduction of the new visa category, technical interns are now formally recognized 
and will remain recognized in the future as an important group of foreign workers.  
Under the TIP system, interns are permitted to stay in Japan for three years, on the 
condition that they pass certain skills tests authorized by the government. However, in 
contrast to Brazilians of Japanese descents that are entitled to renew their visa status, 
technical interns are prohibited from re-entering Japan after the conclusion of their three 
years. The nominal reason given for this prohibition is that, because the interns come to 
Japan with the intent of receiving vocational training, there is no reason for them to 
remain in or return to Japan after their training is completed.  
These two points, the three-year limit and the prohibition from reentering Japan after 
completion of the program, constitute the main institutional restrictions of the Technical 
Internship Program (TIP). Any immigration policy whose intent is to welcome 
immigrants and to keep them in positions on a temporary basis typically includes such 
restrictions. Some restriction is necessary to keep the rotational immigration system 
functioning smoothly and to keep immigrants in temporary workers status. 
The history of immigration in other countries, however, informs us that, once 
immigrants are welcomed into the country, it is hard to restrict or prevent their 
settlement. In all cases, it has been the case that even though immigrations policies 
contained such restrictions, these restrictions merely delayed but did not prevent 
settlement by immigrants. Piore identifies the following common characteristics of the 
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immigration models of West Germany in the sixties and the United States with respect 
to Puerto Rican agricultural workers, which are included piecemeal in the immigration 
policies of various other countries: single-sex recruitment, fixed short-term contracts, 
isolated housing, and prohibition of reentry (in the German Case) (Piore, 1979:83-4). 
Piore argues that institutional barriers are unsuccessful in preventing permanent 
settlement because of (i) the inherent tendency of people, as social beings, to want to 
form permanent, structured communities and (ii) high demand in volatile industries for 
foreign labor to cushion variability and uncertainty. “The settlement processes in both 
Germany and New England have been the result of these industries seeking out foreign 
workers who were originally recruited by others. So long as these industries exist and 
find it advantageous to use migrant labor, it is questionable whether it is possible to 
maintain the institutional barriers that will forestall settlement for any length of time” 
(ibid. 85). That is, Piore correctly points out the difficulty of eliminating “free-rider” 
employers that utilize foreign workers who are already working in the destination 
country rather than having to bring in new workers at their own cost. 
  The issue of free-riders leads to the question of who bears the various costs 
associated with hosting foreign workers. Low-skilled workers typically cannot cover the 
cost of transportation to the destination country and other initial costs associated with 
migration; thus, it is generally the employers that bear these initial costs. Such initial 
costs include not only transportation but also training in language and customs. 
Employers who host foreign workers tend to discourage workers from changing jobs, at 
least until investment costs are recovered; such restrictions may lead foreign workers to 
feel as if they are working as forced laborers. Foreign workers are, in this sense, denied 
freedom to choose employment, which is a basic right of any worker. When the desire 
of foreign workers to change jobs intersects with the demand of employers’ for cheap 
foreign labor, the escape of workers from the original employers registered with the 
immigration office becomes a shared interest of both parties. The decision by employers 
to forego legal channels for obtaining foreign workers, then, may result in increased 
numbers of escapee or illegal workers. 
  In order to ensure that the benefits of hosting foreign workers accrue to 
law-abiding employers, immigration policies often limit the right of foreign workers to 
change jobs, particularly in the case of short-term stays. In the case of the TIP in Japan, 
interns’ stays were initially limited to two years but was increased to three years in 1997. 
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Employers, especially in a garment industry, have asked that this time limit be increased 
to five years. The additional two years of training will enable the garment industry to 
select experienced technical interns with three year’s experience for further training as 
workshop supervisors. Here, we must again consider the problematic aspects of a 
system that does not permit foreign workers to change employment for three years and 
the fact that the addition of two more years of employment under the same conditions 
may constitute an infringement of workers’ fundamental rights. 
  How should we think about this discrete time period during which technical interns 
are deprived of their basic right to choose employment? The TIP’s three year time limit 
is relatively long compared to other immigration programs targeting low-skilled worker. 
In many developed countries seasonal workers such as farm laborers are permitted to 
stay in country for less than a year (Chaloff, 2008; Ruhs, 2003; ――, 2010b). Even 
visas for highly-skilled workers are usually capped at three years. The skill level of 
technical interns is not much higher than that of low-skilled workers; as such, the length 
of their stay is excessive by international standards, especially given the deprived 
conditions under which they have to work. 
  The restriction on technical interns’ length of stay is not only related to issue of  
not being able to change jobs but also has to do with the development of technical skills. 
Although the TIP was nominally established to promote technology transfer, the degree 
to which interns’ skill levels can be developed in the three years of training is 
constrained by the fact that employers are reluctant to provide higher training to those 
workers whom they know will leave in three years. Technical interns stand occupy the 
same niche as part-time and dispatched workers as members of the marginal labor force 
and of the secondary labor market. 
  On the other hand, those interns are expected to work for three years at the same 
company. They do not change jobs frequently as do young workers or dispatched 
workers.  The interns are not disposable, flexible low-skilled workers, but workers 
with a certain degree of skill. Given that the employers bear the costs of transportation, 
accommodation, and initial training, they make reasonable demands on workers to 
develop the ability to work with a passing level of discipline and efficiency. The three 
year time limit on their stay means that the interns will develop skills commensurate to 
three year’s training, not more and not less. As such, at the end of their stay, the interns 
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are no longer low-skilled, but also cannot be said to be highly-skilled workers. 
(2) Prohibition of Reentry  
  Technical interns are strictly prohibited from reentering Japan as technical interns. 
It is a commonly held view among TIP stakeholders that, once interns enter Japan on a 
“Technical Intern Training” visa, their only chance of subsequently returning is on a 
student visa
１
.  Most of the jobs for which technical interns are admitted are not 
classified as “Skilled Jobs” in the present visa rubric. The Japanese immigration system 
currently prohibits entry of foreign workers in manufacturing and construction 
industries. This has changed the nature of the TIP. For example, cement masons and 
reinforcing iron and rebar workers in construction industry, or lathe and milling 
machine workers and welders in manufacturing industry are not permitted to enter Japan 
on a “skilled jobs” visa, and have had to enter as the TIP interns.  
  Thus, while the TIP, on the one hand, prohibits the reentry of semi-skilled workers 
who have completed training in Japan, the current Japanese immigration system, on the 
other hand, does not permit the entry of industrial workers on working visas. These two 
institutional barriers tend to discourage interns’ motivation to acquire technical skills 
and employers’ motivation to train workers. As a result, both employers and interns 
have good cause for supporting the additional two-year training period proposed as an 
amendment to the present TIP. 
   If the proposed additional training period or similar extension is adopted, serious 
consideration should be given to the right of interns to change employment, to bring 
their families to Japan, as well as the criteria for their potential permanent settlement. 
Given the strict three year time limit currently in place, most TIP stakeholders do not 
even contemplate the possibility of permanent settlement, which also opens the door to 
discussion of escapee and over-stay workers. However, limiting the scope of this 
discussion to the present TIP, suffice it to say that the issue of permanent settlement of 
interns should be considered in the long run. 
(3) Prohibition on Family Reunion 
The right to family reunion is one of the fundamental rights of foreign workers 
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declared in the “ 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families.” But temporary foreign workers are not 
necessarily considered to be in the same category as ordinary foreign workers, given 
their shorter lengths of stay and the presumption that they will return to their country of 
origin once their stay is completed. The US’s Bracero and foreign workers’ programs in 
both Singapore and Taiwan prohibit family reunion, whereas the US’s H-1B program 
and Germany’s Gastarbeiter Program both allow family reunion. 
  In Japan, Brazilians of Japanese descent are allowed to bring in their families with 
them, but technical interns are not. In practice, the prohibition of family reunion 
functions as a disincentive for permanent settlement. Was this prohibition, then, 
included explicitly to discourage the settlement of foreign workers? Up to this point, I 
have discussed the unintentional impacts of various migration policies that were 
adopted in response to employers’ demands but with insufficient consideration of the 
long-term needs of society as a whole. 
  With regard to the TIP, the permanent settlement of interns is a concern for the 
government but not for the employers of interns, many of whom are owners of small- 
and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are currently facing stiff competition from 
China and other emerging economies in the products market. Market pressures force 
such companies to focus on strategies for survival and not abstractions such as social 
prosperity.  Thus, the future settlement of interns (or lack thereof) is not their concern. 
Their concern is how to cut labor costs, and prohibition of family reunion is a 
reasonable strategy from the standpoint of cutting costs. So long as the interns come 
alone, they can be accommodated in inexpensive, shared housing and can be paid wages 
appropriate for a single worker.  
  Ujihara studied Japanese migrant workers from rural areas in the 1950s (Ujihara, 
1975:285-7), clarifying the relationship between modern industrial workers in cities and 
their rural backgrounds. Ujihara theorized that Japanese industrial workers typically 
could not become independent from their families in rural areas since their wages were 
insufficient to serve as more than a supplement to household income. This explanation, 
however, is only applicable to the period prior to Japan’s high-growth era.  
The employers of small-and-medium-sized enterprises today desire a young and 
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unmarried labor force such as were common in the 1950s. Such labor, however, has 
been scarce since the late 1980s. Their efforts to secure alternative labor led to the 
establishment of the TIP, which prohibits interns from bringing their families with them. 
This prohibition, then, enables employers to secure a workforce similar in character to 
their desired workforce.  
 At present in Japan, two discrete groups constitute the low-skilled foreign workforce, 
Brazilians of Japanese descent and the TIP interns. Those in the former group are 
permitted to bring their families with them and typically work as dispatched workers in 
large companies in electronics or machinery industries; those in the latter group 
typically work in SMEs in the garment, electronics, and machinery industries, along 
with agriculture and fishery. The productivity of SMEs is such that they cannot afford 
the high wages required to employ Brazilians of Japanese descent. The growing 
disparity concerning working conditions and job security between standard and 
non-standard workers is seen as one of the major social problems facing Japan.  
However, the TIP interns’ wages are even lower than those of non-standard workers, 
and their working conditions are more oppressive than those of dispatched workers 
including Brazilians of Japanese descent. Japan has enjoyed relative affluence since 
1970’s, and there was once consensus that labor disputes had all but disappeared. 
However, such labor disputes, thought to be a thing of the past, have once again 
surfaced with the establishment of the TIP
２
.  
How do interns without families live in Japan? Foreign workers typically lead 
stressful lives, especially when they are separated from their families, experiencing 
multiple stressors related to health, money, and communication. Being separated from 
their families for three years is especially difficult for married women, leading many to 
become homesick. Most affected are young mothers with small children, who feel they 
have had to sacrifice time with their children to work abroad. Interns living in Japan 
often lack the comforts and conveniences that allow them to reduce living cost. 
Furthermore, if they live in remote areas, they are deprived of pleasures such as 
window-shopping and other comforts that would be available to them in urban areas.  
Prohibition of family reunion may be effective in preventing the settlement of interns; 
on the other hand, the practice’s effectiveness is attained at cost of the interns’ welfare. 
The reason why the 1990 UN convention on foreign workers has only been ratified by a 
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small number of countries lies, partly, in the recognition that family reunion tends to 
lead to the permanent settlement of migrants in the destination country. The prohibition 
of family reunion in the TIP is necessary for maintaining the inflow (and outflow) of 
young and single foreign workers. From the standpoint of today’s employers seeking 
single workers, such a rotation system is highly desirable. However, such disruption of 
ordinary family life is not sustainable in the long run. 
(4)  Restrictions on available jobs and repatriation of unemployed workers 
As the primary goal of the TIP is technology transfer, the jobs for which interns are 
hired are limited to those classified as skilled and which require skills tests. Immigration 
policies typically place restrictions on the types of jobs or industries allowed with little 
relation to the purpose of such immigration, be it technology transfer or foreign aid. The 
Japanese government does not limit the work of Brazilians of Japanese descent, as they 
are not classified as “workers” under the present immigration rubric, they can get visa 
based on who they are and not based on what they can do as a worker.  In other words, 
Japanese Brazilians’ “Permanent Resident” visa is issued by ascription while “Technical 
Intern Training” visa is issued by achievement.  If working visas are issued regardless 
of work ability, then those visa holders tend to take low-skilled jobs.  This is the case 
with Japanese Brazilians.  And the TIP interns who migrate to Japan on their 
achievement bases, some kind of occupational restrictions are thought to be necessary. 
The same can be said of for Eastern Europeans from newly accessed EU countries 
working in the EU. They are no longer considered foreign workers and, thus, are 
afforded the same freedom of movement within the EU as other EU members; there is 
virtually no limit placed on their ability to obtain work permits, save for restrictions on 
the total number of permits issued.  All immigration policies intended to bring in 
foreign workers place some restriction on acceptable job categories, regardless of skill 
level. The US’s H-1B visa may be a typical example. Such restrictions usually represent 
a compromise between the needs of employers, labor unions, and governments.  
Furthermore, all recent immigration policies of Western European and Asian 
countries targeting foreign workers include some restrictions on eligible jobs. Sato 
(2010: 9) describes the current situation as follows: taking temporary labor migration 
policies by Western European countries in the 1960s and 1970s as the first phase, 
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Germany and other Western European countries have come to the conclusion that the 
first phase immigration policies failed in that they led to the settlement of a large 
proportion of the foreign workers. Therefore, despite the tremendous increase in foreign 
worker reception since the 1990s, all countries, based on the experiences of the first 
phase, have shifted to immigration policies targeting specific industries and jobs and 
that also explicitly precluded the possibility of permanent settlement. Such restrictions 
on eligible industries and jobs are deemed necessary to ensure “a compulsory rotation 
system that strictly prevents the transitioning of workers to permanent settlement.” 
Restriction on jobs has become a common feature of the immigration policies of 
countries that receive foreign workers.  
The trend of immigration policy in developed countries shift to temporary rotation 
system of migrants or what is called circular migration (Castles & Miller, 2009:67-70). 
Castles & Miller point out that circular migration is a legitimation device for stricter 
border control.  And we find another warning to temporary migration in an OECD’s 
paper.  An editorial in SOPEMI 2008 (OECD, 2008:17-20) is titled as “Temporary 
Labour Migration: An Illusory Promise?” and points out that needs of some occupations 
are likely to be long-term in nature and that it may be difficult to fill the vacancy of 
these occupations with temporary foreign labour force. Its conclusion is that temporary 
labor migration is at best a partial solution.   
If we look at the present TIP from the standpoint of temporary migration system, the 
above comment is quite reasonable.  Labor shortage occupations are specific and their 
shortage is easily seen to be continuous, both the TIP interns and host employers 
welcome longer staying period of interns and wider range of available jobs.  Therefore 
in order to sustain a rotation system, strong restrictions on available jobs are 
necessitated. 
Considering the restriction on jobs available to foreign workers, what difficulties 
have such restriction caused in the lives of temporary workers (in this case, technical 
interns) who are subject to such restriction? In the case of technical interns, given that 
the purpose of their stay is technology transfer, employment in Japan in the same job as 
in their home country is a condition for being accepted into the program. However, as 
this condition has been less-stringently enforced in recent years, it does not function as a 
substantial obstacle to technical interns.
３
 As the number of interns has increased in the 
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last ten years, so too has the proportion of technical interns who were previously 
unemployed or who worked in agriculture; strict adherence to the same-job rule while 
maintaining the restriction on reentry of previous interns would limit the number of 
potential program enrollees to the point that the program could no longer be effectively 
executed.   
As such, the true impact of the restriction on jobs of technical interns is in its 
limitation of the interns’ ability to change jobs once in Japan. This is not especially 
problematic if the company where the technical intern is employed does not go 
bankruptcy during the three year training period. However, if the company downsizes or 
fails due to unfavorable economic circumstances, the technical intern will become 
unemployed and be left with no choice but to return to his or her home country.  
First, companies that host foreign workers are often marginal companies with limited 
resources and do not have the ability to pay sufficient wages to employ Japanese 
workers; such companies are more apt to lay off workers or to go bankruptcy as a result 
of unfavorable economic conditions. Second, in so far as technical interns are 
considered to be members of the secondary labor market and employed almost in the 
same job ladder as Japanese and Brazilian dispatched workers, which is most often the 
case in the machinery and metal industries, they are subject to the same vulnerability in 
terms of being first in line to be laid off. The decision of whether to lay off dispatched 
workers or technical interns first differs from company to company. Examples of 
companies laying off relatively higher-paid dispatched workers of Japanese descent first, 
before laying off technical interns have been reported.
４
 It is likely that there are also 
cases where the repatriation of technical interns is chosen over the laying off workers of 
Japanese descent or Japanese dispatched workers. In any case, technical interns in the 
secondary labor market enjoy little job security. For technical interns facing such 
unstable employment, the restriction on jobs means increased difficulty in finding new 
employment in the host country (Japan), if and when they are laid off.   
Given that it is typically whole industries, and not just individual companies, that 
suffer the negative effects of unfavorable economic circumstances, during such times, it 
is difficult even for indigenous workers to find employment within the same industry. In 
such situations, vocational retraining is necessary to enable workers to move to other 
industries or jobs. Such vocational retraining is offered by various job training agencies 
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across the country as part of the country’s overall employment policy. Technical interns 
who face restriction on available jobs in which they may be employed are unable to 
change occupations. Furthermore, the pool of potential new employers is limited those 
that are certified to host technical interns. As a consequence, technical interns are left 
with little choice but to repatriate before reaching the end of the three-year training 
period. Since the global financial crisis that occurred in 2008, companies with the 
wherewithal to do so have held off on repatriating technical interns already in Japan but 
have ceased recruiting new interns; companies with less reserve capacity have 
repatriated technical interns as a result of downsizing or forced layoffs due to failure of 
the business.    
In conjunction with enactment of the new immigration law of 2010, the immigration 
office of the Ministry of Justice announced “guidelines for the entry and residence of 
technical interns” on March 2009. According to these guidelines, as a means targeting 
interns “whose training cannot be continued due to company failure, etc.,” interns, if 
they so desire, are permitted to remain in the country under the condition that they will 
continue their training with another company certified to host technical interns under the 
TIP program. The guidelines also require that dispatch agencies in Japan continually 
monitor an acceptable number of interns among host companies, reflecting the view that 
the layoff of interns should not lead to their premature repatriation. These guidelines can 
be considered a measure to prevent technical interns who have lost their jobs from 
becoming illegal workers. As long as the ability of technical interns to switch jobs 
remains restricted, it is only by making the host program responsible for securing new 
places of work that interns who have lost their jobs will be able to find new employment. 
In reality, however, technical interns cannot seek new employment at a public 
employment office (Hello Work) like their Japanese counterparts, and if they are unable 
to find employment of the same job at a company affiliated with the same program, they 
will be prematurely repatriated.   
Given that the early repatriation of technical interns does not increase the domestic 
unemployment rate, from a societal perspective, it may be seen as a way to protect the 
domestic labor market. However, from an individual perspective of each technical intern, 
such premature repatriation can represent a significant derailment of life plans. The 
interns arrive in Japan after having calculated how much they can expect to earn in 
Japan, how much they can afford to pay and borrow in order to participate in the 
 14 
 
program, and when any loans need to be repaid. In so far as premature repatriation 
represents a derailment of such plans, it must be said that loss of employment has a 
greater impact on technical interns than on their native counterparts.
５
 Of course, some 
technical interns who have achieved their savings goal (of 3 million JPY, for example) 
early (by working overtime) report that being repatriated several months early is a 
blessing in disguise, as they can get home early; thus, the feelings of individual interns 
regarding early repatriation may depend, to some extent, on the degree to which they 
have achieved their savings goals.
６
        
From the above, it can be seen that occupational restrictions common to almost all 
immigration policies put foreign workers in a position of disadvantage during economic 
downturns by restricting foreign workers’ movement between jobs in the host country.  
 (5) Other working conditions 
Technical interns’ wages are subject to minimum wage standards as set forth in the 
Labor Standards Act. If it can be proved that the overtime wage is lower than the 
minimum wage, interns can file claims with the local labor standards office and demand 
that they be paid the difference.
７
 While the number of cases in which such 
underpayment is corrected represents a very small portion of the total number of such 
cases, technical interns are afforded, at least on paper, the same protection under the 
Labor Standards Act as their Japanese counterparts.  In this sense, Japan’s law is 
clearer than that of the US with regard to the H-1 visa or the H-2B visa for farm workers, 
which states that the wages of workers should not be below the “prevailing wages” for 
the respective jobs. Thus, while there are, in the US case, multiple wage standards for 
foreign workers depending on the skill, qualification, and technical skills of the worker 
in question, in Japan, technical interns are employed at the clearly-defined, 
unambiguous minimum wage.  If technical interns are able to prove that they are being 
underpaid for overtime, trade unions or NPOs that provide assistance to technical 
interns can help ensure that the employers pay the difference between what interns were 
actually paid and what they should have been paid.  The problem, then, does not lie in 
the law itself but rather in the sphere of law enforcement.  Because they come to Japan 
as new comers, technical interns are not always made aware of Japan’s laws regarding 
extra pay for overtime, are unaware of the fact that they are not being paid or are being 
underpaid.  As is often the cases, they are prevented from filing under the contracts 
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with dispatch agencies in sending countries, or simply do not know how to file such 
claims. 
In addition, technical interns are eligible to receive workers’ compensation and are 
enrolled in health insurance and welfare pensions. NPOs that assist foreign technical 
interns have requested that the requirement for enrollment in welfare pensions be 
waived for technical interns, given the extremely small likelihood that they will receive 
any benefit from such pensions since it is presumed that they will return to their home 
countries after completion of their training. The same request is made by business 
organizations representing the companies that also must contribute to welfare pensions. 
At present, technical interns are paid a lump-sum severance from the welfare pension 
upon their repatriation; however, many technical interns have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with this system because the sum they receive is less than what they paid 
into the system. This policy needs to eventually be reexamined.    
With regard to the other working conditions of technical interns, it can generally be 
said that what is even more problematic than the appropriateness of the minimum wage 
standard is the fact that this standard is not being met. This is related to the problem of 
the technical interns’ lack of knowledge, and the fact that some dispatch agencies, while 
cognizant of this lack of knowledge, have not taken any steps to improve the situation. 
The labor standards office guidelines mentioned above require that newly arriving 
technical interns are provided information regarding immigration law and the Labor 
Standards Act during the intake orientation and, further, provide for money to hire 
judicial clerics and labor management specialists to provide this instruction. Such 
measures are a first step to improving the current situation.              
3. Management of Daily Life and Formation of Industrial Workforce 
Up to this point, we have examined the restrictions placed on the rights of technical 
interns in the TIP. We now turn attention to how technical interns spend their days in the 
workplace and in their private lives. In particular, we will examine the daily 
management systems put in place by their employers.      
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 (1) Types of housing: Dormitories and boarding houses 
Regardless of whether the worker is Japanese or foreign, and regardless of whether 
the host country is Japan or any other countries, when companies hire single, migrant 
workers, they must provide them with some kind of housing. This is because migrant 
workers, by definition, do not reside in the host region.    
In countries other than Japan that take in foreign workers, it is rare for foreign 
workers to stay in hotels that cost money; rather, it is common for workers to stay with 
friends while they look for work. Workers of Japanese descent typically stay in 
dormitories provided either by the dispatch agencies or the company to which they have 
been dispatched. In the case of technical interns, provision of housing for technical 
interns is a necessary condition for companies to attain certification to host technical 
interns. Such housing, which can take the form of dormitories, detached houses, or 
apartments, etc., is required to provide approximately 6 tatami mats worth of space 
(~100 ft
2
 or 9.2 m
2
) space per two individuals, bedding, plates, utensils and other 
furnishing needed for daily life, cooking facilities, and bathing facilities. In order to 
conserve water, some employers make it a point to remove bath tubs, leaving only 
showers.
８
 In other words, technical interns only need to provide their own clothing and 
personal items; the host company provides an environment that will enable the workers 
to live without experiencing any inconvenience. Put another way, businesses must 
invest in the preparation of such a housing environment if they are to host technical 
interns. The high cost of training foreign workers is not the only reason for businesses to 
want to become “free riders” and to employ foreign workers that have escaped. 
Companies wishing to host foreign workers are required to prepare housing, often at 
substantial cost, that is deemed adequate by the immigration office and dispatch 
agencies both in sending countries and in Japan.   
While such certification standards exist for the hosting of technical interns, the actual 
condition of the dormitories and boarding houses provided varies widely. The housing 
fees also vary substantially. In general, monthly rent, which is directly deducted from 
interns’ pay along with electricity and water usage fees, is on the order of 30,000 to 
40,000JPY.
９
 According to a survey of foreign workers in the marine products 
processing industry, of a monthly salary of 150,000 JPY, 85,000 JPY is saved, leaving 
an estimated 65,000 JPY for room and board (Miki 2005: 51). Meanwhile, according to 
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a survey conducted by the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization 
(JITCO) in 2005, on “housing fees collected from technical interns” in the TIP, the total 
rent collected per person over the two year program (at the time, length of stay was two 
years not three) was, on average, 399,000 JPY, or a little less than 17,000 JPY per 
month (JITCO 2005: 52). In certain cases, such as when a garden shed on farm property 
is converted into intern housing, no rent is collected.  
The type of housing provided by companies varies substantially. While companies 
already possessing dormitories used previously for single Japanese workers can simply 
convert these to house foreign interns, companies without such existing facilities have 
had to create housing by various means, including buying and converting disused textile 
mills, converting upper floors of factories or house attics, setting up temporary housing 
in parking lots, and renting private apartments.   
Such housing can be considered welfare facilities and, as such, represent salary paid 
in kind. There have been cases of ill-managed small companies hosting technical interns 
that, in order to cut labor costs, have deducted excessive housing fees from interns’ pay 
while providing substandard housing. In many cases, technical interns’ rents are 
determined unilaterally by companies, in complete isolation from the general housing 
market. Meanwhile, because utilities are deducted along with rent, some interns feel 
little incentive to conserve electricity or water, frequently resulting in conflict with the 
company owners who are responsible for paying for utilities. Given that the use of 
electricity, water, and gas as well as general housing features such as air conditioning 
and heating are daily matters, they often are the underlying cause of troubles between 
workers and employers. The mutual mistrust that arises from such conflicts eventually 
grows into the larger conflicts regarding overtime pay and non-payment of salaries. 
While boarding life presents problems for both employers and technical interns, the 
reason why such housing is essential to the TIP can be explained as follows. First, the 
priority of employers is to employ technical interns at as low a wage as possible, and, in 
order to be able to take advantage of low-wage migrant workers, it is necessary to 
provide them with housing. Second, by housing interns in or near the factory itself, it is 
possible to manage their lives throughout the whole day. By monitoring the interns 24 
hours a day, it is possible to preempt any insubordination aimed at employers and to 
prevent escape from workplace. Although the stated reason for housing two or more 
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workers in the same room is to prevent homesickness, there is another reason, namely to 
create an environment in which the interns watch each other. Third, given that no other 
housing is available to interns, they cannot invite friends or relatives to stay overnight 
with them, as in the case of workers of Japanese descent, and their relationships are 
limited to workers with whom they reside. Naturally, they are not allowed to walk about 
freely on their own and are required to sign out when leaving the housing, usually in 
groups of two or more. These measures are to prevent interns from attempting escape.                
Because the interns are forced to live in such group housing, their subordination to 
the company is extensive. As is the case for dispatched workers, for the foreign interns, 
being laid off means losing their housing; interns' latent fear of being laid off or sent 
home is usually greater than those of indigenous workers. This is because interns stand 
to lose their housing on the very day that they are laid off.      
On the other hand, technical interns generally consider boarding life to be desirable. 
By being limited to life in the factory and in factory housing, they not only are able to 
save on living expenses but are able to use time that otherwise would be spent 
commuting to and from work (if their housing was not near their workplace) to work 
overtime.  They tend to choose a kind of confined life in company housing for the sake 
of saving living expenses. 
There is no doubt that dormitories and boarding houses present certain merits to both 
employers and interns. However, because such arrangements do not include potential 
values that exist in the general housing market and because, under such arrangements, 
interns do not act as independent agents of their own livelihood, such housing is 
necessarily accompanied by certain restrictions on the interns’ rights and freedoms. 
Dormitories and boarding houses have come to be avoided by single Japanese workers 
after Japan’s high-growth era. Even though large manufacturing plants have begun to 
provide dormitories with single rooms, it has become increasingly difficult to recruit 
young workers to the manufacturing sector where such dormitory life is deemed 
necessary. Naturally, it is even more difficult for SMEs that are only able to provide 
lower-standard housing to recruit workers, so much so that the very term “live-in 
employee” in shops and small businesses has become all but extinct. This is because 
Japanese workers have come to despise the lack of freedom in such housing 
arrangements. To the interns, however, no matter how restrictive such housing might be, 
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there is no other housing available, and they have no choice but to live there. The 
tradition of the “live-in employee,” which had all but disappeared from Japan, is being 
revived and carried on by foreign technical interns.          
 (2) Common rules for workplace and personal discipline 
A second characteristic of the management of the technical interns’ daily lives is the 
fact that both dispatch agencies in home countries and host employers in destination 
countries try to maintain interns’ workplace and personal discipline with a common set 
of rules. Personal discipline includes basic rules such as being on time, not lying, not 
stealing, not committing adultery, cleaning up after one’s self, maintaining one’s 
personal hygiene, and so on that are necessary when living with others in a group or 
community. Meanwhile, workplace discipline refers to basic rules such obeying one’s 
superiors, not being late, maintaining safety standards, not cheating, etc., necessary in 
the execution of work and life in the workplace.  
In the case of technical interns, rules for personal and workplace discipline are 
ambiguously combined to form one set of rules. Interns are taught that fundamental 
rights of workers such as the right to file a grievance against managers, join a union, 
have a cell phone, negotiate working conditions with the employer, etc. and 
fundamental personal rights such as the right to move about freely are violations of 
workplace and personal discipline. With such training, it is no wonder that the interns 
do not have a concept of workers’ rights.   
Let us examine, for example, the trainee program eligibility criteria of a large 
dispatch agency in Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China, which sends over 400 
technical interns to Japan annually. The criteria comprises a list of “20 ineligibility 
criteria” consisting of such items as “the applicant has relatives or friends in Japan,” 
“the applicant’s spouse is applying for dispatch at the same time,” “applicant’s 
relative(s) is (are) applying for dispatch in the same cohort.” These criteria are intended 
to reduce the risk of interns breaking their contracts and staying illegally in Japan. The 
list also includes other items related to the applicant’s character and attitude such as 
“applicant has a criminal history (pick pocketing, burglary, affray, etc.),” “applicant has 
bad habits (alcohol, uses foul language, thinks only of personal gain),” “applicant is 
selfish and self-centered,” “applicant exhibits unusual fashion, appearance, and 
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behavior,” “applicant lies and is insincere,” “applicant is cynical and introverted.” Also 
included are other items related to family circumstances such as “applicant is still single 
although past the age for marriage,” “applicant is a single divorcee,” “applicant has 
family relation problems,” “applicant does not show filial piety,” “applicant does not 
fulfill family obligations.” Finally, the list includes miscellaneous items such as 
“applicant does not bear hardship well,” “applicant comes from an affluent family, and 
is accustomed to high income,” “applicant is not self-reliant.” To summarize, it is 
individuals willing to suffer any hardship for their families without considering it to be a 
hardship and individuals who are poor but motivated to work that are selected as interns. 
Among the list of 20 criteria, there is only one skill-related item, that being “applicant is 
not suited for technical work.” Such criteria bring to mind images of migrant workers 
from Japan’s forgotten past with “good morals and manners.”  
Actually, in many small-scale garment factories, interns are instructed to call the 
owner “Otosan” (father) and the owner’s wife “Okasan” (mother). This practice did not 
start with the recruitment of interns but, rather, is a traditional practice stemming from 
the period before the Second World War when young workers from rural areas would 
come to work in factories. The custom of managing workers by creating a 
pseudo-family organization in which the antagonistic relationship between employers 
and employees is ambiguated has traditionally been passed down among SMEs. In the 
present day in which young Japanese workers, who have distaste for such arrangements, 
have all but disappeared, the management practice is now being applied to foreign 
interns.     
Naturally, such management style is not seen in large companies involved in the 
manufacture of automobile appliances or electric/electronics products; some larger 
companies place greater emphasis on the acquisition of Japanese language as a means to 
increase productivity than personal discipline. As such, family-style work management 
cannot be said to be the daily experience of all interns. However, approximately 65% of 
companies hosting interns (in 2010) were small-scale businesses with fewer than 19 
employees, many of which are believed to practice traditional family-style management 
of interns’ daily lives.        
The TIP provision specifies that technical interns should require eight weeks’ 
pre-dispatch training within six months of arriving in Japan.  Large dispatch agencies 
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in sending countries often give this pre-dispatch training on behalf of Japanese dispatch 
agencies.  Chinese dispatch agencies which aim is to send technical interns to Japan 
are especially dedicated to this training, because they face tough competition with 
similar agencies and because they need to provide a kind of workforce who are 
welcomed by Japanese employers.  Such training is not limited to Japanese language 
instruction. The pre-dispatch training, as a rule is based around dormitory life, is, in and 
of itself, a type of life-style training, with veterans of the People’s Liberation Army 
serving as instructors or playing the role of employers. While this pre-dispatch training 
involves a certain degree of skills training and physical fitness training, such as 
long-distance running, in addition to instruction in the Japanese language, its primary 
purpose is to improve personal discipline.  
In China, major pre-migration training facilities conduct rajio taiso (literally radio 
exercises), i.e. calisthenics training typical of Japanese workplaces, on a daily basis as 
part of physical fitness training. In the pre-dispatch training facility in Shandong 
Province visited by the author, interns were to conduct muscle strength training and run 
to 3,000 meter twice a week to increase physical strength.
１０
 Such interns-in-training 
were provided with uniforms similar in appearance to those worn in Japanese factories, 
with the resulting scene of interns performing calisthenics conjuring up images of a 
Japanese company at lunchtime. These days, in Japanese factories, workers don’t do 
calisthenics even when the rajio taiso music is playing but, rather, sit around on the 
stairs and chat with each other. There is nothing of the sincere and desperate demeanor 
of the Chinese pre-dispatch interns. Considering the fact that the instructors are often 
veterans of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, it is easy to imagine the interns’ 
physical training as basic military training. In that sense, the interns are “soldiers” being 
dispatched to Japan. This physical training has two purposes, the first of which is to 
develop the physical strength needed to work in Japan. The second purpose is to weed 
out individuals unable to endure the training and, thus, deemed unsuitable for internship 
program. Such emphasis on physical fitness indicates the shared perception among 
dispatch agencies that the three years of employment in Japan not only means a 
potential for significant earnings but also requires a high level of physical endurance in 
day to day life.   
There is, of course, a reason why dispatch agencies have determined that physical and 
lifestyle training is necessary and, they have undertaken such trainings. The Japanese 
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companies taking in these interns want a modern workforce that is committed to 
improving productivity and to diligently carrying out its responsibilities. However, due 
to the fact that Japanese immigration policy does not permit the re-entry of previous 
technical interns, the number of applicants with prior experience and skills in 
manufacturing has declined steadily and has almost reached bottom. As a result, the 
majority of dispatch agencies’ recruits are young people from farming households or 
migrant workers who have come from farm villages to work under temporary contract 
in factories in coastal areas in China. If we consider a characteristic of labor market in 
developing countries, we find a common fact that the redundancy of labor in the 
agricultural sector and deficit of skilled workers in the manufacturing sector is typical 
and that those workforces serve as sources for foreign workers. Then it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority of interns will be unskilled or semi-skilled. Dispatch agencies 
have determined that, in order for such workers to successfully complete their three 
years in Japan and return having fulfilled their duties, what is even more important than 
skills training is comprehensive lifestyle training or, in other words, increased 
management of workers. Work in Japanese factories, because of the higher pay, is faster 
paced and more intense than factory work and most certainly agricultural work in the 
interns’ developing country of origin.     
To be certain, what is needed first and foremost to be able to fulfill factory work in a 
Japanese factory is personal discipline. However, lumped in with this personal 
discipline is the prohibition of going outside without permission, prohibition of owning 
a cellphone, prohibition of filing complaints about working condition, prohibition of 
contact with the outside, prohibition of negotiations for pay hike, etc. Furthermore, 
efforts are made to create arrangements where interns watch each other and make sure 
personal discipline is observed in dormitory life through the use of award-giving 
program and collective responsibility system and by establishing competition between 
groups. Violations of rules result in forced repatriation. Under such strict regulation of 
daily life, interns rarely focus on their position as workers and think about engaging in 
disputes or negotiation with employers.   
In summary, with such strong emphasis on personal discipline, work discipline, 
which usually is considered in a separate category, becomes subordinated within 
personal discipline. And the concepts of workers’ rights and respect for workers’ private 
lives, which are supposed to be included in work discipline, vanish into the mist. 
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Together, these constitute the second problem faced by technical interns living in Japan.  
But a difficulty lies in a fact that both personal discipline and work discipline are 
requisites for forming industrial workforce out of rural workers.  An ideal type of 
managers in dispatch agencies in sending countries are usually not the type of greedy 
capitalists but intelligent and enlightened officers who concern about workers life and 
future of their nation
１１
. Therefore those managers believe any kind of disciplinary 
training is necessary both for workers and for their nation. The question of workers’ 
rights tends to be ignored by every party concerned. 
(3) Isolation from the local community 
At present, the relationship between interns and local communities is amicable. There 
appears to be little chance that this relationship will develop into the kind of trouble or 
violence that is seen in other countries. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
numbers of interns is still small, and they do not compete with Japanese workers in the 
local labor market; instead, they are seen in a positive light as helping to slow the 
decline of local communities. The second, less salient reason is that the interns are 
isolated from the local community, and, as a result, their relationship with the local 
community is weak.       
Let us examine the first reason. The agriculture, fishing, and manufacturing industries 
in which the interns are employed are generally situated away from urban areas. The 
garment or machinery and metals industries, and of course the agriculture and fishery 
industries, in which large numbers of interns are employed are often located in 
under-populated areas where labor costs are low. The local young people tend to leave 
the area, either because they dislike the poor working conditions offered by local 
businesses, fear that there is little future in staying in the area, or are attracted, as young 
people are apt to be, to life in the city. In such rural area bereft of young people, 
although local businesses have been sustained by experienced, elderly male workers and 
middle-aged part-time female workers, members of these two cohorts have begun to 
retire. It is this gap, then, that is being filled by the young, foreign interns. In 
depopulated areas with aging communities, interns account for the majority of young 
people, and it is by their “youth,” not their appearance, that the interns are identified by 
members of the local community as being foreigners.     
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While a detailed examination of the relationship between the depopulation of rural 
communities and foreign interns is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that, under 
the present Japanese marginal and local communities, these interns represent the only 
young workers in such rural areas. From the standpoint of the labor market, the newly 
arrived foreign workers do not represent competition for the existing Japanese 
workforce, but rather a complementary force to compensate for the loss of Japanese 
workers due to retirement.    
As such, it can be said that the inflow of foreign workers is welcomed by rural 
communities. For example, one of the measures for revitalizing rural areas introduced 
by the government has been the establishment of “Special Zones for Structural 
Reform,” which enjoy the relaxation of certain regulations allowing for the proactive 
employment of foreign workers. One example of special zones for structural reform 
established since 2003 was both for highly-skilled workers, typically IT workers, and 
for the TIP interns. One such zone for the TIP interns was designated in the Toyo region 
of Ehime Prefecture, whose local industries are garment and towel manufacturing and 
shipbuilding and machine manufacturing; another zone centered on the marine products 
processing industry was designated in the coastal Okhotsk region (Hokkaido).
１２
 As is 
evidenced by these policies, the employment of foreign workers is technically linked to 
the revitalization of rural communities.  
The second characteristic of the relationship between interns and local communities 
is that interns are generally isolated from local communities. Unlike government 
officials and employers, the general populations of rural communities do not go about 
their daily lives thinking about revitalization of the community. As such, it is not 
surprising that some community members have a sense of wariness regarding the 
employment of foreign workers. For this reason, except for specific occasions such as 
community festivals, foreign workers are kept isolated from the local community to 
avoid any unnecessary friction.   
First of all, the factories where interns work are typically located on cheap land far 
from city centers. In such cases, going shopping is inconvenient without a car. Interns 
must either borrow a bicycle to do so or be taken grocery shopping by the employers in 
the company-owned car. The area around the factories is usually unpopulated. 
Furthermore, given that many interns work late into the night and on weekends or 
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holidays in order to receive overtime pay, they have very little time to go outside of the 
factory. As the interns are in Japan by themselves, they also do not experience social 
interactions with the community as might otherwise if they had to take their children to 
and pick them up from school every day. The only troubles with local communities 
experienced by the interns are on a small scale, having to do with the manner in which 
the garbage is thrown out, etc. In general, the interns’ interactions with the local 
community are rare in terms of both spatially and temporally.            
Furthermore, there are some cases in which employers actively try to isolate the 
interns from the local community. Reasons for doing so include fears that, if interns 
interact with each other, they will exchange information and begin to compare wages 
and other working conditions, resulting in dissatisfaction with the workplace or that, if 
interns interact with brokers, they will be encouraged to escape or change jobs. In other 
words, the employers feel that to allow the interns to interact with the community 
increases the risk of labor disputes and the risk of abscondence. The job of brokers is an 
introduction of new job opportunity, and, as such, they encourage foreign workers to 
leave their jobs illegally; the system is structured such that the more frequently foreign 
workers change jobs, the greater the handling fees earned by brokers.      
The interns arrive in Japan without a firm understanding of Japanese companies, the 
working conditions provided by their host companies, or provisions of the Labor 
Standards Act or the minimum wages. Thus, it is not at all surprising that the interns, in 
the process of actually working in Japan, exchange information with other interns 
regarding working conditions, etc. However, such exchange of information is not 
necessarily desirable from the employers’ standpoint. There are some employers that 
prohibit the possession of cell phones for this very reason. Although JITCO, which 
oversees and provides guidance to the host companies, prohibits such practices, the 
prohibition is not strictly enforced.
１３
    
Meanwhile, there are generally negative images associated with companies that hire 
foreign workers. Those kind of companies are stereotyped as providing such poor 
working conditions that they can only hire foreign workers and as exploiting foreign 
workers who are paid meager wages, while the foreign workers, on their part, are 
stereotyped as being pitiable, often to the detriment of such companies’ ability to do 
business.       
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Given these circumstances, employers take the approach of isolating their foreign 
workers from the local community, both from the practical standpoint of preventing 
workers from escaping and also from the publicity standpoint of maintaining their 
public image.   
As can be seen from the discussion above, the relationship between the interns and 
local communities is a complicated one. At the same time that some individuals benefit 
from the employment of interns, there are others outside the sphere of benefit that feel 
wary about or oppose the interns’ presence. Under these conditions, the approach of 
isolating foreign workers from local communities is taken as a means to maintain 
peaceful labor relations. As revealed in interviews with technical internship returnees in 
China, the result is that many interns, despite having lived for three years in Japan, 
experienced only the small area surrounding their place of employment and were 
completely removed from Mt. Fuji or the cherry blossoms, which they had dreamt about 
seeing before going to Japan. Not only separated from families and relatives in their 
home country but also segregated from local communities in Japan, it is evident that the 
interns live in relative isolation during their tenure in the TIP.           
4. Conclusion 
It is evident from our examination of the individual provisions of the TIP that they 
represent efforts to prevent the permanent settlement of interns and to maintain the 
rotational employment system. Similarly, if we look at the management of the intern’s 
daily lives, although not clearly stated in any document, the purpose of such 
management is to ensure the interns’ repatriation and prevent their escape. In either case, 
the result is a restriction on the intern’s ability to change employment during their stay 
in Japan. While ability to change employment is a fundamental right secured for 
indigenous workers, countries that recruit unskilled foreign workers place restrictions 
on the movement of these workers to some extent. In the case of Japan’s TIP, which 
takes a rotational approach, the movement of interns between employers is not 
permitted. The program has been revised in 2010 to make a Japanese dispatch agency 
responsible for replacement of employment for those interns who have lost jobs due to 
involuntary reasons such as failure of or lay off from the company where they were 
originally employed, enabling change in employment under certain circumstances. 
However, identification of new employers is difficult, particularly under unfavorable 
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economic conditions, with the result that interns are forced to repatriate. The potential 
for forcible repatriation, which is built into the present system, represents a potential 
chronic threat to interns who are employed, making it difficult for interns to express 
their views to employers and to advocate for their own rights.        
If we shift our attention from the structure of the program itself and focus on 
individual host companies, we find that interns’ lives are strictly managed and that the 
interns face severe restrictions in terms of privacy and personal freedom as well as 
isolation from located communities. Because their right to change employment is not 
guaranteed, if interns are dissatisfied with their situation, unlike indigenous workers 
who have the option of quitting or changing jobs, their only options are to repatriate or 
run away and continue working in Japan as an undocumented, non-regular workers.   
Usually temporary foreign workers cannot enjoy full working rights as indigenous 
workers in developed countries where social welfare systems are well-provided by 
national tax system. Therefore those temporary foreign workers are marginal and 
vulnerable group in a given society.  As with the case of the TIP, the structure of the 
TIP to maintain a rotation system of foreign workers denies freedom to change 
employment.  The right to change employment gives much greater protection to 
workers than any labor laws can assure. So the question is how to secure the right of 
free movement on the side of workers without putting law-abiding employers’ interest 
at risk.   
The TIP has been sustainable for almost twenty years in Japan.  But Japanese 
immigration policy as a whole is still in process of development.  It may change in some 
day, but since the new TIP began in 2010, the first thing to do is to enforce proper the 
program properly, while concerning the future amendment of the TIP interns’ staying 
period, which should result in giving them wider rights to choose employment. 
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１ From an interview conducted in Weihai City, China on August 6th, 2010, one of the returnee 
interns who worked for an automobile appliance factory in Toyota City as a welder told his future 
plan.  He was smart enough to find his next job in Weihai City while he had been working in Japan 
by sending his CV through an internet provided in his dormitory.  The 28-year-old man said he was 
eager to return Japan to get lump sum money.  It was all right with him to get student visa to reenter 
Japan.  But by hearing from some Chinese dispatch agency, Japanese immigration office has ever 
admitted former technical interns under different immigration rubric.  The intention of the 
immigration office may in a way be reasonable to exclude foreign students who come for work, not 
for study.  
 
２ The Japanese unionization rate decreased to 18.5% in 2010, and the number of 
participants in labor disputes is continuously decreasing.  But this trend does not 
necessarily mean that industrial peace is realizing.  In place of labor union, grievances and 
claims from an individual worker increased.  Labor disputes between foreign workers and 
employers may categorized as individual labor disputes, since those workers are usually not 
union members. 
３ In cases where the degree of industrial development differs significantly between the sending and  
receiving countries, the restriction on workers in the same occupation represents a substantial 
obstacle to the recruitment of foreign workers. That is because there are not enough workers in the 
manufacturing sector of the sending country to send to do factory work in the receiving country. In 
addition, the TIP prohibits the reentry of former technical interns, making the recruiting and 
selection of qualified workers more difficult each year. The result has been that the 
same-occupational restriction increasingly exists in name only, and records regarding the experience 
and jobs of interns prior to their arrival in Japan are spurious.          
 The results of the “Survey on Employment Outlook of Japanese Firms Including the Employment  
of Foreign Workers” conducted in March, 2009 by the Nomura Research Institute under commission 
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) are as follows. When asked what 
aspects of trainee and technical intern intake require improvement, 60% of manufacturing sector 
companies (textile, forge and foundry, industrial machinery, electric/electronics device, automobile, 
food industries, etc.) did not respond; of the responses returned, the most common was “the intake of 
unskilled workers“ (13.5%), followed by the “provision of working permits to capable trainees and 
technical interns” (10.7%), and “the re-entry of returnee interns” (7.8%), indicating a desire to 
increase the intake not of technical interns for the purpose of skills acquisition but rather of workers 
to join the regular workforce. Meanwhile, only 0.1% of companies responded that the 
previous-employment requirement for trainees (in the case of group intake situations only) should be 
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eliminated, clearly indicating that this requirement was not seen as being effective from the 
companies’ perspective.   
     
４ (From an interview conducted in Weihai City, China as part of the survey mentioned in endnote 
1). The case of a 25 year-old male who worked for an electronic components manufacturer in 
Toyohashi City, Aichi Prefecture from August, 2006, to March, 2009. Although the worker was laid 
off due to an economic downturn and repatriated four months early, he was soon rehired by an 
electronics company in Weihai City. The temporary return to his home country did not create any 
problems with his life. 
 
５
 For example, there was a case in which interns forced to return home early filed a complaint 
against the dispatch agency in their home country (China) for breach of contract (from an interview 
of a dispatch agency in Changshu City, Jiangsu Province, China conducted on October 27, 2009). 
The dispatch agency had no experience of premature repatriation of workers dispatched to the textile 
industry. However, in 2009, male interns dispatched to the machinery and electrical/electronic 
device manufacturing industry, which utilizes technical interns in the same manner as dispatched 
workers as a means to deal with an fluctuation in production, were forcibly repatriated before the 
end of their three-year training period. The 59 repatriated interns brought a suit against the dispatch 
agency, claiming that the 36-month contract, at a price of approximately 10,000 CNY per month 
(approx. 130,000 JPY), had not been fully implemented. It is believed that this group decided to file 
their own lawsuit after exchanging information with other repatriated interns that have filed similar 
lawsuits against other dispatch agencies. It appears that the situation will be resolved by the return of 
the management fee collected prior to the interns’ departure to Japan and the payment of settlement 
fee by the dispatch agency equivalent to 1 to 3 month’s pay. It is perhaps the dispatch agencies’ 
advertisement to the effect of, “you can earn 3 million JPY in 3 years working in Japan,“ that lead to 
such lawsuits.   
 
６
 Regarding the work behavior of foreign workers, Piore (1979) reported that if workers received 
higher wages, they worked fewer hours to achieve the earnings goal they had previously set. He 
explained that this behavior stemmed the fact that these foreign workers were “target earners” (Piore 
1979: 95-98). Under favorable economic conditions, temporary migrant workers tend to shorten the 
length of their stay; and, if their wages decline as a result of unfavorable economic circumstances, 
they tend lengthen their stay and move more rapidly towards permanent settlement. 
 Given the short history of foreign workers in Japan, research on this topic is scarce. Following the 
global financial crisis of 2008, some Brazilians of Japanese descent returned to their home countries, 
while others who “couldn’t return even though they wanted to” chose to stay and be unemployed. 
Technical interns, who had no other choice but to repatriate early, were forced to do so, regardless of 
the degree to which they had achieved their earnings goals.  
７
 For more details regarding such cases, please refer Gaikokujin Kenshusei Mondai Nettowaku 
(2006) and Gaikokujin Kenshusei Kenri Nettowaku (2009).  
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８
 See the Gaikokujin Kenshusei Ginoujisshusei Ukeire Nyumon [Introduction for the Intake of 
Foreign Trainees and Technical Interns] (Japan International Training Cooperation Organization 
2001: 40-42).  
 
９
 The Research Institute for Advancement of Living Standards (Rengo-Soken) conducted a survey 
of 49 technical interns in 2010. Of the 25 interns who responded, mean monthly rent was 40,000 
JPY. In many SMEs where technical interns are employed, the technical interns are not provided a 
payslip, with the result that many interns do not know the details of their payments and deductions.  
１０
 One large primary intake agency that receives technical interns from Indonesia claims, in its 
advertisements to recruit host companies, that “our technical interns can run 3,000 meters in 15 
minutes or less.” Such training is actually implemented in the interns’ home countries, based on the 
experience that the interns will find it difficult to work in Japan without such training.    
     
１１ The TIP originally began between Chinese local government and Japanese industrial 
organizations such as garment or welding, with the help of Japanese local 
government, many of  the CEOs in Chinese dispatch agencies have had careers 
in local governments’ offices. 
 
１２
 However, along with intake of increasing numbers of foreign trainees, the Toyo region has 
experienced an increase in escapes by trainees and technical interns, which has led to increased 
monitoring of companies by the police and the immigration office; this, in turn, has led to the 
development and spread of independent arrangements between companies to secure foreign workers 
through the practice of “name-lending.” In 2008, the number of companies applying for special 
accommodation in the special zones fell to zero. Meanwhile, the recruitment of foreign trainees 
continues in the marine products processing industries in villages and towns such as Sarufutsu and 
Esashi, in northern Hokkaido. In addition, new special zones are being established in cities such as 
Wakkanai. The absence of workers other than foreign technical interns in Japan’s under-populated 
border areas can also be seen from these examples.     
 
